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Abstract. Digital Rights Management (DRM) is a technology that provides 
content protection by enforcing the use of digital content according to granted 
rights. DRM can be privacy-invasive due to many reasons. The solution is not 
easy: there are economic and legitimate reasons for distributors and network 
operators to collect data about users and their activities, such as traffic modelling 
for infrastructure planning or statistical sampling. Furthermore, traditional PET –
such as encryption, anonymity and pseudonymity– cannot solve all the privacy 
problems raised by DRM, even if they can help. Privacy and security 
considerations should be included in the design of DRM from the beginning, and 
they should not be considered as a property that can be added on. PET is 
considered as technology for privacy protection, in different fields. However, PET 
solutions are not the only ones to be considered useful to complement DRM 
systems. The contrary is also true: DRM systems are adapted as technical 
platforms for privacy. In short, there is a deep change in PET related to the web 
2.0, and it is also true for P2DRM: transparency and other new techniques are 
preferred, or at least added, to anonymity, authentication and other traditional 
protections. 
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1. DRM has the potential for threatening privacy  
 
Digital Rights Management (DRM) is a technology that provides content 
protection by enforcing the use of digital content according to granted 
rights (Conrado et al. 2004). A DRM system normally includes content 
protection, rights creation and enforcement, identification of users and 
usage of content monitoring: 
  
– Security and integrity features of computer operating systems, for 
instance, file-access privileges.  
– Rights-management languages that determine whether requested 
uses should be allowed. 
– Encryption  
– Digital signatures provide assured provenance of digital content 
and non repudiation of transactions. 
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– Fingerprinting and other “marking” technology so as to facilitate 
copy tracking, distribution or usage. User tracking or network 
control of users’ computers are potentially destructive for user 
privacy. Data collection by distributors and network operators can 
be a real problem for user’s privacy. 
 
– Thus, DRM can be privacy-invasive due to many reasons 
(Feigenbaum et al. 2002): 
 
– DRM does not support anonymous or unlinkability, so it is quite 
different from buying a CD paying cash. 
– DRM content acquisition is also privacy-invasive. A distributor 
may use complete DRM metadata with digital content. Each file 
downloaded by a user from the distributor’s web would include 
both the content and the metadata with the “rights” that the user has 
acquired. So the user could only access the content as specified by 
the metadata. And the rights’ metadata are minable as user 
information. 
– The device uploaded can also be privacy-invasive. The download 
could be oriented to a specific device with a serial number. The 
device is then the user’s information that can be collected and 
mined. The upload of the device, due to malfunctioning or 
purchase of a new one, also offers the possibility of tracking user’s 
information. 
– Another DRM privacy problem is the usage track. The downloaded 
content of the user can also be mined and collected. The potential 
tracking of a concrete user’s information includes all its listening, 
viewing and reading.     
– Finally, there are economic reasons for collecting user’s data. For 
instance, DRM data networks should provide usage tracking for 
efficient management and artists’ compensation, but should not 
provide user tracking. Personal Identifying Information (PII) such 
as names, addresses and telephones should be preserved; for 
example, using anonymous payment.   
 
 
2. Traditional Privacy Enhancing Technologies  
(PET) cannot solve all problems 
 
2.1. LIMITS 
 
The solution is not easy. There are economic and legitimate reasons for 
distributors and network operators to collect data about users and their 
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activities; for example, traffic modelling for infrastructure planning or 
statistical sampling. Furthermore, traditional PET, like encryption, 
anonymity and pseudonymity cannot solve all the privacy problems raised 
by DRM, even if they may help (Feigenbaum et al., 2002).  
 
2.2. CRYPTOGRAPHY 
 
While cryptography is useful for the Trusted Computing Base (TCB), it is 
considered inadequate for commercial content distribution (Feigenbaum et 
al., 2002).  Cryptography needs to define exactly whether there is 
legitimate use of data or not and what the single relationship between two 
identified persons or institutions is. Another difficulty with cryptography is 
that public-key cryptography is slow, so if privacy in DRM uses this 
possibility, it will reduce considerably the rate of simultaneous 
connections. On the other hand, DRM will not generally accept 
cryptographic e-cash but it will rather continue with credit cards. As a 
result, vendors will have the possibility of learning how much is paying 
someone. 
 
2.3. AUTHENTICATION 
 
Traditional authentication can also be criticized. The management of users’ 
identity should be based on recognition rather than authentication 
(Seigneur, 2009). As Seigneur says, in an authentication process there is: 
 
– Enrolment: generally involves an administrator or human 
intervention.  
– Triggering: someone clicks on a web link to a resource that 
requires authentication to be downloaded. 
– Detective work: the main task is to verify that the entity’s claimed 
identity is correct. 
– Action: the identification is subsequently used in some ways. 
– On the other hand, recognition consists of: 
– Triggering (passive and active sense): the recognising user can 
trigger itself.  
– Detective work: recognising the user. 
– Upper-level action (optional): the outcome of the recognition is 
subsequently used in some ways. 
 
The recognition process is an example of a more general replacement for 
authentication that does not necessarily bind an identity to the recognised 
identity. On the contrary, authentication is a recognition process that binds 
a real-world identity to the virtual identity. The possibility of recognising a 
IntelligentMultimedia.tex; 28/05/2010; 20:00; p.279
A. Roig 280
user, analysing some of its attributes, is sufficient to establish trust based on 
past experience. One way of preserving both privacy and trust is using 
pseudonyms. Nevertheless, traffic analysis, data triangulation and data-
mining can also associate a pseudonym with the real user. That is the 
reason why it is important that multiple pseudonyms are provided.  
Technical solutions, such as a trust transfer, can be adopted then to 
avoid the misuse of multiple pseudonyms (Seigneur, 2009). Another 
example is the EU-funded FP6 project PRIME (Privacy and Identity 
Management for Europe), whose approach uses “private credentials”. This 
private credentials enable proving one’s authorization (e.g., to be over 18 
years old) without identifying the individual. They are derived from 
certificates issued on different pseudonyms of the same person, and they 
are neither linkable to each other nor to the issuance interaction. Only in the 
case of misuse, the user’s anonymity can be revoked  (Hansen, 2008). 
 
2.4. FUTURE TRENDS 
 
Consumers are largely unable to differentiate between privacy options: 
“Best practices” for privacy engineering have not yet been standardized. 
Even if businesses decide to offer privacy, like Earthlink and its “totally 
anonymous Internet” or Zero-Knowledge Freedom network with its 
pseudonymity, this consumer inability to differentiate motivates companies 
not to invest in expensive technological options (Feigenbaum et al., 2002). 
Indeed, the desire for preserving user’s privacy in DRM may not be 
enough motivation to force an infrastructural change. Some interim steps 
are needed in today’s infrastructure. Even if consumers seem more and 
more concerned about privacy, they do not use at the moment significant 
privacy-preserving tools. New PET and privacy design principles are 
needed for this purpose, at every stage of DRM-system design, 
development and deployment, as can be seen later. Let’s begin with design 
and then see implementations of Privacy-Preserving Digital Rights 
Management (P2DRM).  
 
3. Privacy-friendly Design (or Engineering) for DRM 
 
3.1. PRINCIPLES 
 
Privacy and security considerations should be included in the design of 
DRM from the beginning and they should not be considered as a property 
that can be added on. In fact, integrating privacy tools in legacy systems 
poses many problems (Feigenbaum et al., 2002). First, dual operation due 
to compatibility of two designs is easy to attack. Second, legacy systems 
might expect more information than the information provided by the 
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privacy device. Third, legacy systems might expect different performance 
than the one offered by the privacy protocol. Finally, there may be a 
congestive collapse of networking in the legacy system.  
Some guidelines of privacy protection, the so-called Fair Information 
Principles (FIP) or general principles of the E. U. Data Protection 
Directive, may be useful as practical privacy engineering. Below there is a 
list with general goals which are not concrete technological options:      
  
– Collection limitation 
– Data accuracy 
– Purpose disclosure 
– Use limits 
– Security 
– Openness 
– Participation 
– Organizational accountability 
  
3.1.1. Collection Limitation 
A system should work with minimal data exchanges and PII should not be 
included by default. A first design decision is to analyze the need for 
information and to determine how the information flow can be minimized. 
Most of the system applications will only need pseudonyms instead of PII. 
Proxies can help a collection-limitation approach. Indeed, a trusted third 
party that provides some seal of approval may be preferable than an audit 
that happens after data collection. 
 
3.1.2. Data Accuracy 
If PII is necessary, then it should be erased after its immediate need has 
been fulfilled. 
 
3.1.3. Purpose Disclosure 
Notices should be easily understandable. 
 
3.1.4. Openness 
The idea is to combine notice and auditability. A company will not want to 
be exposed by violating its advertised privacy policy. 
 
3.1.5. Low cost solutions 
The advantage of such general goals or FIPs is that it allows us to consider 
low-cost solutions for privacy-preserving electronic commerce 
technologies. Technological solutions are not always necessary or useful 
for each problem. Some of these low-cost solutions might be (Feigenbaum 
et al., 2002):   
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– Privacy enhancement should be built directly into the DRM 
technology that powers consumer applications. No additional steps 
to protect their privacy should be necessary.  
– The business costs of introducing privacy enhancement into DRM 
should be low. 
– The consumer costs, including “user experience”, of using privacy-
enhanced DRM should also be low.  
  
3.2. TECHNIQUES 
 
On the other hand, some authors consider that it is time to not only include 
privacy goals, but also concrete privacy preserving techniques to help 
engineering designers from the beginning. For instance, PriS is an  
engineering method which incorporates privacy requirements early in the 
system development process (Kalloniatis et al., 2008). Privacy 
requirements are considered as organisational goals that need to be 
satisfied. PriS provides a description of the effect of privacy requirements 
on business processes, and it allows the identification of the best privacy-
preserving system architecture. 
PriS conceptual model is based on the Enterprise Knowledge 
Development (EKD) framework (Kavakli and Loucopoulos, 1999), which 
develops organisational knowledge. It models the organisational goals of 
the enterprise, the processes and the software systems that support the 
above mentioned processes. As a result, a connection is established 
between system purpose and system structure. Privacy requirements are a 
special type of goal, privacy goals, which constraint the causal 
transformation of organisational goals into processes. One relevant aspect 
of PriS is that it indicates the concrete technique available to the designer 
for a goal, once adapted to respect a privacy requirement. So, it’s useful 
during the design, and it helps to bridge the gap between design and 
implementation.  
 
4. New PET for DRM (P2DRM) 
 
4.1. LICENCES  
 
PET is usually considered technology for privacy protection in different 
fields. Nonetheless, Korba and Kenny have observed that the interests a 
service user has in dealing with sensitive data are similar to those of 
providers of copyrighted digital contents (Korba, 2002). Thus, not only are 
PET solutions considered useful to complement DRM systems, but the 
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contrary is also true: DRM systems are adapted as technical platforms for 
privacy.  
For instance, this happens for data protection. One of the aims of data 
protection regulation is control over ones’ data. Furthermore, data 
protection is known in Germany as the so-called self-determination of 
personal data right. Users need more control over their transmitted data, or 
during the use of a service (Hohl, 2007). If we consider sensitive personal 
data, it is sent in a protected way to the service provider. This encrypted 
data has a license attached to it when communicated to the service 
providers. The license limits the use of this personal data. It uses then 
classical anonymization techniques and the concepts of data minimality and 
data obfuscation (Hohl, Zugenmaier, 2007). 
Privacy-preserving DRM system, or P2DRM, should also allow a user 
to interact with the system in an anonymous/pseudonymous way while 
buying and consuming digital content. On the other hand, this has to be 
done in a way that content is going to be used according to issued licenses 
and cannot be illegally copied (Conrado et al., 2004).  
We have already said that some authors consider cryptography 
inadequate for DRM. For others P2DRM can be based on cryptography. 
The idea is that a possible disclosure of the association between the user 
who transfers and the user who receives a given license is a privacy 
concern. This can be avoided with revocation lists and generic (or 
anonymous) licenses issued by the content provider (Claudine Conrado et 
al., 2004). The licenses are anonymous in the sense that they do not include 
any identifier of the user who bought or exchanged his old license for the 
anonymous license. However, they include a unique identifier to prevent 
that an anonymous license is copied and redeemed multiple times. In the 
case of licenses in an authorized domain, the solution proposed is private 
creation and functioning, preventing the content provider from learning 
which domain members composes a domain (Koster, 2006). A domain 
manager device, trusted by the content provider, is introduced to solve 
privacy problems within the domain.  
Personalized restrictions in specific domains are also a proposed 
solution (Petkovic, 2006). One possibility for a user to protect his interest 
and privacy is to apply some access control on licenses or content that he 
obtains from the content provider. However, access control only offers a 
limited functionality. Therefore a solution is a DRM system that allows the 
user to set further restrictions on the licenses obtained from the content 
provider. The proposed method is based on a specific form of a delegation 
license, called star-license, and an activation mechanism. The star-licenses 
allow adding further restricting rights-expressions by indicating who may 
define further restrictions and activate the license (Petkovic et al, 2006.). 
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4.2. DISTRIBUTED DRM 
 
Another PETDRM or P2DRM solution can be a distributed DRM (Abie, 
2004). The design of this system is based on trusted systems (Sadeghi, 
2007). In the core of the system, a Privacy Enforcement Module (PEM) 
allows the privacy officer to define and update privacy policy. On the basis 
of this policy, it will allow or disallow actions. When a request is made for 
access to certain privacy sensitive elements or operations on an information 
object, the request is sent to the PEM. The PEM then decides whether the 
operation is to be permitted or not (Abie et al, 2004).  
  
4.3. MOBILE DRM 
 
Mobile DRM needs also new technical solutions. Even if it is not strictly a 
PET, the guaranty of non-repudiation is perhaps not only useful for DRM, 
but also for P2DRM.  Non-repudiation is in charge of ensuring that no 
party can deny having participated in a transaction (Onieva, 2007). So 
having evidences of malicious activities by any of the peers may help. This 
service has not been included so far in DRM specifications due to practical 
issues and the type of content distributed. Non-repudiation can also protect 
privacy, and more precisely “sensitive information” such as financial 
statement, medical records, and contracts available in digital form. If we 
want to securely store this sensitive information, share it or distribute it 
within and between organizations, non-repudiation is an adequate technical 
solution. A non-repudiation protocol must generate cryptographic evidence 
to support eventual dispute resolution. A trusted third party (TTP) usually 
helps entities to accomplish their goals. One interesting aspect of the 
protocol of non-repudiation proposed by Onieva et al. (2007) is that 
anonymity could be preserved. In that sense, neither the content provider 
nor the user needs any knowledge (i.e., digital certificates) about each other 
in order to reach a successful protocol end. 
 
4.4. DRM FOR PRIVACY INFORMATION RETRIEVAL (PIR) 
 
Another P2DRM to consider is DRM for PIR (Asonov, 2004). PIR 
provides such an execution of user queries over a database of digital goods 
that no information about user queries is revealed, even to the server that 
actually accesses the digital goods. All a provider can do is to count the 
number of queries issued by a single user, and to charge it on a pay-per-
query basis. In a strict version of PIR, DRM cannot be managed. Asonov’s 
(2004) idea is to eliminate this conflict between DRM and user privacy 
relaxing the privacy constraint of PIR. He considers the possibility of 
revealing some information about user queries in order to be able to 
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perform the distribution of interests of DRM. Indeed, users should be able 
to deny any claims about their queries. This repudiation capacity 
transforms PIR in Repudiative Information Retrieval (RIR).  Furthermore, 
the precision of the DRM system depends on the robustness of the 
repudiation provided. 
 
4.5. LOCATION BASED SERVICES 
 
Location Based Services (LBS), like PDA, will also generate a wide range 
of DRM-privacy issues. Gunter et al. describe an architecture based on 
Personal Digital Rights Management (PDRM), which uses DRM concepts 
as a foundation for the specification and negotiation of privacy rights 
(Gunter, 2005). Their prototype, AdLoc, manages advertising interrupts on 
PDA based on location determined by WiFi sightings in accordance with 
contracts written in the DRM language XrML. PDRM uses the same DRM 
mechanisms to enable individuals to license their private data. Indeed, 
PDRM can specify that a private telephone number can only be used once 
for a specific purpose. The prototype approach, as stated before, is based on 
the use of the XrML digital rights language with negotiated privacy rights 
derived from specific sectors.  
 
4.6. PLATFORMS 
 
Multilateral-secure platforms can also offer P2DRM solutions. Sadeghi et 
al. describe a multilateral-secure DRM platform that can preserve some 
aspects of privacy (Sadeghi, 2005). The platform can be realized based on 
existing open platform technologies and trusted computing hardware like a 
Trusted Platform Module (TPM). An interesting aspect is that 
discrimination of open-source software due to TPM can be solved by a 
property-based attestation described by the authors.   
 
4.7. SITDRM 
 
Sheppard et al. (2006) have implemented a privacy protection system 
(SITDRM Enterprise) based on the Intellectual Property Management and 
Protection (IPMP) components of the MPEG-21 multimedia framework 
(Sheppard, 2006). This seems better than using the P3P policy language for 
expressing the privacy preferences of data subjects. P3P is adequate to 
inform data subjects of the global privacy practices of Internet service 
providers. However, users have to specify their preferences regarding a 
particular item of data in DRM. Nevertheless, P3P is used more recently in 
a complementary way with SITDRM to communicate enterprise privacy 
policies to consumers, and enable them to easily construct data licenses 
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(Salim, 2007). SITDRM required the design of an extension to the MPEG 
Rights Expression Language (MPEG-REL) to cater for privacy 
applications, and the development of software that allowed individuals’ 
information and privacy preferences to be securely collected, stored and 
interpreted. The possibility of a future grand unified DRM system seems 
technically feasible, but the authors doubt about the utility of such a non-
specific tool.  
 
5. Conclusions 
 
In 2002, Feigenbaum et al., were convinced that a practical methodology 
for privacy engineering was necessary, involving procedures for the 
analysis of privacy-relevant aspects of a system. Nevertheless, they advise 
that developing such a methodology even for the problem of DRM systems 
would be quite challenging. Has the situation changed from 2002? 
Every new PET seems to have difficulties to be implemented after its 
theoretical formulation. This is also true with respect to DRM. But there is 
a new element that can make the difference in this case: DRM systems are 
also adapted in a way to protect privacy. So PET for DRM and DRM 
adapted to privacy are converging in P2DRM. This can be useful for 
designing and implementing P2DRM from the PET perspective, or from 
the DRM one. So PET and DRM specialists should consider the new field 
an opportunity for respecting both DRM and privacy goals.  
     We have seen that authentication can adapt to a non-identification 
version, more flexible and less dangerous for privacy. Nonetheless, there is 
a deep change in PET related to the web 2.0 which is also true for P2DRM: 
transparency and other new techniques are preferred to anonymity, 
authentication and other traditional protections. Old PET are still useful, 
but they do not give enough guaranty to new privacy threatens. The value 
of transparency tools depends on how precise and understandable the 
information is. Standardization could help humans to understand and 
machines to interpret the information made transparent. Another challenge 
is that a transparency process can be also privacy-invasive. So data 
minimization with minimal disclosure of personal information is usually 
more effective than relying on “notice and choice” (Hansen, 2008). Context 
and purpose limitation attach to the identifiable data is also a new PET tool 
useful with web 2.0, the participatory Web (Weiss, 2008). 
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